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In recent decades many middle income countries (MICs) have liberalized their ﬁnancial
markets. Financial liberalization has typically been followed by lending booms during which
credit grows unusually fast. Some of these booms have been punctuated by twin currency
and banking crises that are followed by a protracted credit crunch.
In this paper we document three credit market imperfections prevalent in MICs that can
explain these boom-bust cycles as well as other macroeconomic patterns observed at higher
frequencies across MICs. These imperfections are the existence of borrowing constraints (the
eﬀects of which diﬀer across sectors), currency mismatch and systemic bailout guarantees.
Prior to twin crises the typical MIC experiences a real exchange rate appreciation and a
lending boom during which the ratio of credit-to-GDP grows unusually fast. In the aftermath
of twin crises there is typically a short-lived recession and a protracted credit crunch that
persists long after aggregate growth has resumed. The credit crunch hits mainly small and
nontradables (N) ﬁrms. In fact, nontradables production declines relative to the output of
the tradables (T) sector for several years after the crisis, and the credit-to-GDP ratio falls.
This asymmetric sectorial pattern is also observed before a crisis as the N-sector grows faster
than the T-sector.
In contrast to the crises of earlier decades, large ﬁscal deﬁcits have not taken center
stage in the new boom-bust cycles. Furthermore, investment is the component of GDP that
experiences by far the largest swings over the cycle, and, at the other extreme, consumption
varies the least.
1These comovements between credit, the N-to-T output ratio and the real exchange rate
also arise at higher frequencies, even if we do not condition on the occurrence of crises. Panel
regressions reveal that credit growth is positively correlated with the ratio of N-to-T output,
with changes in the real exchange rate, and with investment growth. However, credit growth
is not signiﬁcantly correlated with either aggregate GDP growth or consumption.
These comovements and the boom-bust cycle are not observed in countries with developed
ﬁnancial markets. They appear to be the same across MICs, in spite of diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes. These facts indicate that the mechanisms at work are not dependent on particular
features of the exchange rate regime, but rather on other institutional characteristics of
MICs. It has been argued in the literature that they are generated by the interaction of
three characteristics of ﬁnancing typical of MICs. First, there is a pronounced asymmetry in
size and ﬁnancing opportunities across tradables (T) and non-tradables (N) sectors. While
T-sector ﬁrms tend to be large and have access to world capital markets, N-sector ﬁrms are
smaller on average, are bank-dependent and face borrowing constraints.1
Second, in MICs a substantial amount of N-sector debt is dollar denominated, while the
income streams that service those debts are in domestic currency. Since domestic banks are
heavily exposed to the N-sector, the degree of currency mismatch is signiﬁcant. Even when
the banks’ balance sheets are equilibrated, banks face a de facto currency mismatch because
they lend primarily to the N-sector. Thus, they face insolvency risk.
Third, creditors are covered, either explicitly or implicitly, by systemic bailout guaran-
1In MICs T-sector ﬁrms have easy access to external ﬁnance because they can either pledge export
receivables as collateral, or can get guarantees from closely linked ﬁrms.
2tees. It is expected that if a critical mass of debtors risks insolvency, the government will
implement policies to ensure that creditors get repaid (at least in part) and thus avoid an
economic meltdown. These policies may come in the form of an easing of monetary policy,
the maintenance of an exchange rate peg, or the handing out of checks.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we document the credit market imper-
fections. In Section 3 we characterize the boom-bust cycle and the comovements alluded to
above. In Section 4 we describe the mechanism that links the credit market imperfections
to the stylized facts. Finally in Section 5 we present the conclusions.
2. Credit Market Imperfections
Here we present evidence on the three key credit market imperfections that prevail in MICs:
asymmetric ﬁnancing opportunities, currency mismatch and systemic guarantees.
We classify as MICs all countries that satisfy the following four conditions: they have a
per-capita income between $1,000 and $18,000; in addition to banks, the stock market is a
viable source of ﬁnance; they have a population greater than 1 million people; the country
has not engaged in war or civil war during the sample period. Thirty seven countries satisfy
these conditions. We also consider Sweden and Finland, whose per capita incomes are greater
than $18,000 but have experienced often studied twin crises. Thus, our sample consists of
39 countries.2 We consider the period between 1980 and 1999.
2Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Greece,
Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, New
Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela.
3Table 2.1: Sectorial and Size Distributions of Firms
N-Sector T-Sector
Small 68 % 32 %
Large 33 % 67 %
Source: World Business Environment Survey (WBES),
2001.
Note: “small” corresponds to firms with up to 200
employees.
2.1. Asymmetric Financing Opportunities
In order to investigate whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between ﬁrms in the T-sector
and those in the N-sector, we use ﬁrm level data from a panel of 3877 ﬁrms of the World
Business Economic Survey of the World Bank (WBES, 2001). This survey covers 27 out
of our sample of 39 MICs, and it classiﬁes ﬁrms according to their size and, among other
things, whether or not they export.3 Since the share of T-output in the group of export
ﬁrms is greater than that of non-export ﬁrms, we identify exporters with T-sector ﬁrms and
non-exporters with N-sector ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst question we ask is whether ﬁrms in the T-sector tend to be larger than those
in the N-sector. The answer is positive. Table 2.1 shows that, across the 27 countries in the
WBES survey, a majority (68 percent) of small and medium ﬁrms belongs to the N-sector,
while a majority (67 percent) of large ﬁrms belongs to the T-sector. This fact holds true
when looking at the matrices of individual countries. Table 2.2 shows that the distribution
3Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, Indonesia, Lithuania,
Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Tunisia, Uruguay and Venezuela. Schiﬀer and Weder (2001) describe in detail
this data base. It is available from the World Bank at: http://www.worldbank.org/beext/resources/assess-
wbessurvey-alt.htm
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Source: World Business Environment Survey (WBES), 2001. 
 
Note: “small” denotes small and medium firms up to 200 employees. “Large” 
firms have more than 200 employees. 
5Table 2.3: Asymmetric Financing Opportunities
 
Dependent variable: Answer to the question 
“is financing a major obstacle to running your business?” 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
N-sector firms  0.175*** 
(0.039) 
  
Share of exports    -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
NL     0.265*** 
(0.051) 
NS     0.094* 
(0.053) 
Age     -0.000 
(0.001) 
Government share     -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
Note: This table reports regression results of ordered probit regressions, 
specified with a constant and with country dummies. The answer to the 
question “is financing a major obstacle to running your business?” is 
evaluated on a scale from 1 to 4. The independent variable in regressions 1 
and 3 is a dummy that is equal to one for N sector firms and zero otherwise. 
In regression 2, it is the share of exports among T-sector firms. In regression 
3, NL = Non tradable and large, NS = Non tradable and small, the age of the 
firm, and the share of government participation. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses; * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5 percent level and *** indicates significance at the 1 
percent level. 
of table 2.1 is also exhibited by most MICs individually.4
The survey also asked ﬁrms to rank, on a scale from 1 to 4, how much of an obstacle
ﬁnancing was to running their business. We use the answers from this survey to estimate an
ordered probit model to assess whether there exists an asymmetry in ﬁnancing opportunities
across the N and T-sectors.5
We create a dummy variable for the yes-or-no answer “do you export?” A signiﬁcant
positive parameter on the dummy indicates that N-sector ﬁrms evaluate the access to ﬁnance
4There are some large ﬁrms in the N-sector, such as utilities. However, in most countries they represent
a small share of the N-sector ﬁrms in the survey.
5We use the same approach as Schiﬀer and Weder (2001), who compare small and large ﬁrms with
respect to ﬁnancing constraints as well as other indicators of governance. They ﬁnd that small ﬁrms are
more constrained.
6as a signiﬁcantly larger obstacle to running their business than do T-sector ﬁrms. We
estimate ordered probit regressions of the following form.
y
∗
i = β0 + β1EXPORT + β2AGE + β3GOV + γ1d1i + ... + γndni + εi,
where yi =

          
          
1i fy∗
i <α 1
2i fα1 <y ∗
i <α 2
3i fα2 <y ∗
i <α 3
4i fα4 <y ∗
i

          
          
,
n =2 7 , and EXPORT is either a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm does not
export, or it is the share of exports in output among exporting ﬁrms. GOV controls for
government participation in the ﬁrm, AGE denotes the year a ﬁrm was established and
d1...dn are country dummies. The dependent variable, y, captures the ranking of the severity
of an obstacle for running a business, as perceived by the ﬁrms. The obstacles considered
are ﬁnancing, collateral and the exchange rate. The true y is not directly observed, and the
α parameters are estimated together with β0...β3 and γ1...γn.
Table 2.3 reports the regression results: regression 1 is the basic regression where we
regress the perceived credit constraints on the N-sector dummy. Regression 2 replaces the
N-Sector by a variable that measures the percentage of output that is exported by exporters.
Regression 3 reports the results of a regression that diﬀerentiates between small and large
N-ﬁrms, and includes the age of the ﬁrm and the share of government participation as control
variables.








Source: Dwor-Frecaut, D, M. Hallward-
Driemeier, F.X. Colaço, Asian 
Corporates’ Credit need and Goverance, 
Presented at the 1999 World Bank 
Conference in Bankok. 
 
In all regressions we ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between exporters and non-
exporters in their evaluation of ﬁnancing as an obstacle to running their businesses. The
latter consider the obstacle to be more severe. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that among exporters,
the larger the share of exports in output, the less signiﬁcant is ﬁnancing deemed to be as an
obstacle for running a business. We also ﬁnd that older ﬁrms have easier access to ﬁnancing
than younger ﬁr m s .T h es a m ei st r u ef o rﬁrms with high government participation. None of
the control variables, however, obviates the role of the exporters/non-exporters indicator.
Next, we ask whether bank credit depends on collateral and whether there is a statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the N- and T-sectors in this respect. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 shed
light on this question. Table 2.4 shows that in most MICs, the majority of bank loans are
indeed secured by collateral. The percentage ranges from 40% in Malaysia to 90% in Korea.
I nT a b l e2 . 5w em a k eu s ea g a i no ft h eW B E Sd a t as e t ,w h e r eﬁrms were also asked to
evaluate how much of an obstacle the access to collateral is to running their business. Table
2.5 shows that even after controlling for other factors, such as government share and the age
of the ﬁrm, the importance of collateral is viewed as signiﬁcantly more severe by the ﬁrms
8Table 2.5: The Role of Collateral as an Obstacle to Obtain Financing
 
Dependent variable: the answer to the question: 
“Is collateral a major obstacle to obtain financing?” 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 N-sector firms  0.127*** 
(0.039) 
 
Share of exports    -0.0005* 
(0.008) 
 
NL     0.118* 
(0.052) 
NS   0.034* 
(0.055) 
Age   -0.004 
(0.001) 
Government share    -0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Note: Table 4 reports regression results of ordered probit regressions, specified 
with a constant and with country dummies. The answer to the question, “Is 
collateral a major obstacle to obtain financing?” is evaluated on a scale from 1 to 
4. The independent variable in Regression 1 is a dummy that is equal to one for 
N sector firms and zero otherwise. In Regression 2, it is the share of exports 
among T-sector firms. In Regression 3, NL = Non tradable and large, NS = Non 
tradable and small, the age of the firm, and the share of government 
participation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance 
at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level and *** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
9Table 2.6: Structure of Cooperate Financing in Korea
 
 1997  1998  1999 
Borrowing from Domestic Money Banks 
large 25.1 29.6 28.1
SME 74.8 70.3 71.8
Gross issuance of cooperate bonds 
large 90.8 99.1 94.3
SME 9.2 0.9 5.7
 
Source: IMF country Report 00/10 
 
in the N-sector than those in the T-sector.
Aside from easier access to bank credit, ﬁrms in the T-sector are typically large ﬁrms
that have the possibility to issue bonds and stocks as substitutes for bank credit. Figure 2.6
illustrates this for the case of Korea. While small and medium enterprises account for about
75% of domestic bank credit, more than 90 percent of domestic bonds were issued by large
ﬁrms.
2.2. Currency Mismatch and Banks Exposure to the N-sector
Currency mismatch exists when liabilities are denominated in foreign currency, while the
income streams that must service these debts are denominated in domestic currency. Cur-
rency mismatch has become an important issue in MICs because sudden real depreciations
increase signiﬁcantly the debt burden of a large group of agents, generating a meltdown of
the banking system.
Unfortunately, there are no readily available indices of currency mismatch, so the question
arises as to how best to measure this concept. First of all, currency mismatch need not be a
problem that aﬀects the aggregate economy. It is a sectorial problem that mainly aﬀects the
10Table 2.7: Bank Lending by Sector
 
 Assets 






Argentina (95)  67.1
3 32.9 
Chile (85)  60.1  39.9 
Korea (97)  74.8
5 25.1 
Mexico (95)  66.0  33.9 
Peru (96)  59.2  40.8 
Thailand (97)  66.5  34.5 




Sources: See Appendix. 
 
Notes: 1) N-Sectors: Construction, Real Estate Business, 
Infrastructure, Services, Personal Consumption, Commerce, 
Wholesale and Retail, Housing, Electricity-Gas-Water, 
Restaurants, Hotels, Transportation, Small. 2) T- Sectors: 
Mining, Quarrying, Industry, Agriculture, Forestry; Industrial 
Sector, Foreign Entities, Primary Production, Imports, Trade, 
Large, Other. 3) not including consumption or Housing credit. 
4) only consumption credit is N. 5) N is proxied by small, T is 
proxied by large firms. 
 
N-sector. It may well be the case that there is enough foreign currency available to service
the debt. However, if N-sector debtors and the banks that lend to them have currency
mismatch, then a real depreciation might generate a meltdown, unless the government can
implement a redistribution from the T to the N-sector on short notice. Clearly, these ﬁscal
transfers are not feasible.
Since in MICs banks are heavily exposed to the N-sector, we can get a more precise
indicator of currency mismatch by looking at the balance sheet of the banking system.
Table 2.7 shows that, on average, only about a third of bank lending goes to ﬁr m st h a tc a n
potentially be classiﬁed as belonging to the tradeable sector. This indicates that the banking
system is strongly exposed to the N-sector.6
6In order to bias the results against the hypothesis that banks are heavily exposed to the N-sector,
11Table 2.8: Share of foreign currency liabilities covered by income from exports
 
 Liabilities  Assets  Foreign  currency 
coverage of assets 
Currency 
Mismatch 
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 










Argentina (95)  35.0  32.9  0.30  9.8  3.57 
Chile (83)  46.7  39.9
1 0.28  11.2  4.17 
Korea (97)  17.9
2 25.1  0.34  8.53  2.97 
Mexico (95)  33.4  33.9  0.23  7.7  4.34 
Peru (96)  73.0  59.2  0.34  20.1  3.62 
Thailand (97)  22.3  34.5  0.17  5.8  3.85 
Turkey (93)  47.0  66.0  0.24  15.84  2.97 
 
Source: See Appendix. 
 
Note. 1) Data on loans in Chile are 1985. 2) Foreign liabilities data in Korea is from 1993 – 
thus the mismatch in 97 must have been much larger. 3) The results are biased against 
finding our hypothesis of currency mismatch in several important ways: 1) Off balance 
sheet items are not included, which are primarily in foreign currency. 2)Due to legislation 
banks tend to underreport their foreign currency holdings as a share of liabilities (see 
Kamin et. al 2001). 3) We assume that all revenues from exports can be used to service the 
debt. All firms in potentially tradable sectors are assumed to indeed be tradeable. 
 
Since banks are strongly exposed to the N-sector we cannot determine the degree of
currency mismatch by simply comparing the liabilities and the assets of the banking system.
A bank can have 20% of its liabilities in dollars and 20% of its assets denominated in
dollars. However, if all the loans are granted to the N-sector, there is a de facto currency
mismatch because there is insolvency risk. It may be even more misleading just to compare
the denomination of deposits and loans, as these are only a subset, and a small subset at
that, of the total balance sheet.7
we assume that all ﬁrms in sectors that are commonly considered tradable are indeed tradable. Thus, we
group manufacturing, mining, agriculture, forestry, and primary production as tradables, while construction,
services, electricity-gas-water are considered nontradables. Note that the fraction of bank lending that goes
to consumption or housing credit is not covered by foreign currency income and thus also counts as non-
tradable. In most countries, the ﬁgures would be even higher if these items were included (consumption and
housing credit are only available for Hungary, Mexico and Thailand).
7For instance, foreign currency deposits in Thailand account for less than 10% of the total foreign external
liabilities of the banking system.











Source: World Bank Development indicators (year: 1994)
Our index of currency mismatch compares the share of foreign currency liabilities of the
banking system to the share of loans that are covered by export income. We compute the
latter ratio by multiplying the share of bank lending that goes to the T-sector by the share
of T-sector output that is actually exported. Column (c) in Table 2.8 shows that exporting
ﬁrms sell the majority of their output in the domestic market. Thus, they too must earmark
a large share of domestic currency revenue for servicing foreign currency debt.
Our index of currency mismatch is reported in column (e) of Table 2.8. The estimates
range from 2.97 for Korea in 1997 to 4.34 for Mexico in 1995.8 To see that currency mismatch
is mostly a sectorial, not an aggregate, problem compare Table 2.8 with Table 2.9. Notice
that the foreign debt service-to-exports ratio is low in countries with a high currency mis-
match index. A banking system where only 15-30% of dollar loans are covered by exports
are certainly subject to substantial real exchange rate risk. This is true even though the
aggregate measures of Table 2.9 do not indicate currency mismatch.9
8Our estimates of CM are conservative. More realistic/accurate estimates would take into account that
the amount of foreign currency revenue that is available to service debt is less than total foreign currency
income. Some of the foreign currency income is required to pay oﬀ the factors of production.
9A high foreign debt service-to-exports ratio signals a CM problem. However, just because this aggregate
132.3. Systemic Guarantees
Despite the fact that bailout guarantees have played an important role in several explana-
tions of boom-bust cycles, the evidence supporting the existence of this distortion is mainly
anecdotal. Although many countries have systemic guarantees in place, it is very diﬃcult to
document their existence directly. The diﬃculty in pinning guarantees down is that in most
cases they are implicit. To begin with, they are not limited to promises to hand out a bailout
payment to lenders in case of default. They are often implicit in the exchange rate regime
and monetary policy rules. Since in most instances one of the objectives of policymakers
is to avoid sharp drops in output, they will implement policies that are, de facto, implicit
guarantees against systemic crises.10
We investigate whether there are implicit guarantees by looking at the behavior of interest
rate spreads. The idea is that if guarantees are present, the spread will, ceteris paribus, be
insensitive to a deterioration in the average quality of loans, assuming, of course, that no
crisis has yet occurred. When a crisis occurs, the quality of loans collapses and the spread
skyrockets.
An ideal way to measure the evolution of the loans’ quality is with the ‘true’ share of
non-performing loans (NPLs). Unfortunately, such data in time series form does not exist
for most MICs. A good proxy for an increase in NPLs is the occurrence of a lending boom
in the recent past. When there is a sharp acceleration in credit, the monitoring capacity
measure may be low, one cannot infer that there is no CM.
10Systemic guarantees are not the same as deposit insurance schemes, which cover individual agents against
idiosyncratic risk.
14of both banks and regulators is diminished, so that there is an increase in the likelihood of
granting credit to bad projects. The increase in the share of NPLs may take some time to
materialize because it takes time for a given loan to become non-performing and because
during the boom a lot of new loans are being granted. Nonetheless, after some time NPLs
must become a problem for the banking system. This is true regardless of whether NPLs
are oﬃcially recorded.
To capture this idea we run the following panel regression
(ρ − r)j,t = αj + α1LBj,t−1 + α2Dj,t · LBj,t−1 + εj,t, (2.1)
where (ρ−r)j,t is the interest rate spread as deﬁned earlier, in country j at time t. LBj,t−1 is
a dummy that indicates the existence of a lending boom. It is equal to one if during the past
2 years real credit has grown by more than 10% on average. Dj,t is a dummy that indicates
that twin banking and currency crises have occurred at t or t − 1.
The coeﬃcient α1 measures the eﬀect of an increase in NPLs on the spread in country-
years in which a crisis has not occurred in either the current or the previous year. Meanwhile,
the sum α1+α2 measures the eﬀect of an increase in NPLs on the spread during crisis times
(at t or t−1). As we discussed above, in order to isolate the eﬀe c to fg u a r a n t e e sw en e e dt o
distinguish between periods in which a crisis has not occurred recently, and periods where a
crisis has occurred recently. This is because systemic crises are typically preceded by lending
booms and during crises the spread shoots up.
T h en u l lh y p o t h e s i st h a tt h e r ea r es y s t e m i cg u a r a n t e e si sH0 : α1 =0 . Table 2.10 exhibits
15Table 2.10: Implicit Bailout Guarantees
 
Dependent variable: Interest rate spread 
 
  (a) MIC 8  (b) Group of 39 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
LB j,t-1 2.559***  1.330  0.723**  -0.188 
 (0.930)  (0.875)  (0.348)  (0.485) 
Dj,t*LB j,t-1  3.849***  2.833*** 
   (1.131)  (1.007) 
Adj. R
2  0.531 0.636 0.631 0.634 
N  74 74  244  244 
 
Note: The table shows the estimates of the panel regression in (5.1). 
The lending boom dummy, LB, is equal to one, if the growth rate of 
real credit has been larger than 10 percent on average for the past two 
years. The crisis dummy, D, indicates that a twin crisis occurred in t or 
t+1. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects, using a GLS 
estimator.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 
percent level and *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  
the estimates of regression (2.1). Panel (a) considers a set of 8 MICs frequently discussed
in the literature, while panel (b) considers the full set of 39 MICs. In both cases we cannot
reject the null at the 10% signiﬁcance level. That is, we cannot reject the presence of systemic
guarantees. Interestingly, if the crisis dummy is disregarded and the spread is regressed only
on the lending boom dummy, the estimated coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%
level.
If we were to deﬁne systemic guarantees literally as promises to hand out a bailout
payment to lenders in case of default, we could investigate the proportion of crises that
have triggered this type of bailouts, and then impose rational expectations to infer the ex-
ante implicit guarantee. Bordo and Schwarz (2001) and Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2000) ﬁnd
evidence of ex-post bailouts during the last two decades and the early banking crises of the
20th century.
163. Macroeconomic Patterns
The credit market imperfections we have documented give rise to macroeconomic patterns
that are common across MICs, but are not typically observed in high income countries. In
this section we illustrate these patterns both by examining the comovements of the relevant
variables conditioning on the occurrence of twin crises, and by characterizing the uncondi-
tional comovements of these variables. In the next section we describe the mechanism that
links the credit market imperfections to the macroeconomic patterns.
W ec h a r a c t e r i z et h eb o o m - b u s tc y c l eb ym e a n so fe v e n tw i n d o w so v e rt h ep e r i o d1 9 8 0 -
1999 on the set of 39 MICs where, in addition to banks, the stock market is a viable source
of ﬁnance. Figure 3.1 shows that prior to a crisis there is a real appreciation and a lending
boom during which credit grows unusually fast. In the aftermath of a crisis there is typically
a short-lived recession and a protracted credit crunch that aﬀects mainly the N-sector. In
fact, N-production declines relative to the output of the T-sector and the credit-to-GDP
ratio continues to fall for several years after the crisis. Investment is the component of GDP
that exhibits by far the largest (and statistically signiﬁcant) deviations from tranquil times,
while consumption deviations are very mild and insigniﬁcant.11
We characterize the unconditional comovements by means of panel regressions over the
same period and set of countries. In the panel regressions, we allow for random and ﬁxed
eﬀects.12 The partial correlations cannot, of course, be interpreted as causal relations. How-
11Figure 3.1 is taken from Tornell and Westerman (2002a). See that paper for details.
12All variables are in ﬁrst diﬀerences in order to avoid the issues associated with non-stationarity. These
patterns have been characterized by Tornell and Westermann (2002b).
17Figure 3.1: The Boom-Bust Cycle
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18Table 3.1: Random Eﬀects Model
 
Dependent Variable: Real Credit Growth 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1/Real exchange rate  0.370***  0.356***  0.212* 0.216** 
 (0.074)  (0.089)  (0.112)  (0.106) 
N/T output ratio  0.294***  0.387***  0.241* 0.290** 
 (0.109)  (0.127)  (0.139)  (0.137) 
Interest rate spread    -0.002**  -0.071***  -0.063*** 
   (0.001)  (0.021)  (0.020) 
Investment     0.306***  0.219*** 
     (0.107)  (0.078) 
Consumption     -0.228   
     (0.263)   
Deficit     0.614**  0.591** 
     (0.249)  (0.259) 
Net exports      0.000   
     (0.001)   
Adj. R
2  0.211 0.180 0.363 0.376 
#  countries  30 26 25 25 
 
Note:. The table reports the regression results from a model with random 
effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; * indicates significance at 
the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level and *** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  
ever, they indicate the variables that theoretical models should emphasize.
The ﬁrst regression in Table 3.1 shows that an increase in credit is associated with (i) a
decline in the interest rate spread, (ii) an increase in the ratio of N-to-T output, and (iii) a
real appreciation. It is remarkable that these partial correlations are signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. Correlation (i) suggests the existence of a credit channel. Correlation (ii) is consistent
with the fact that the N-sector is more credit-constrained than the T-sector. Correlation
(iii) is consistent with the existence of a balance sheet eﬀect.13
Among components of GDP, what is surprising is the dog that didn’t bark: consumption
and net exports do not move with credit growth. In contrast, investment and the ﬁscal deﬁcit
13The MICs we examine have experienced crises from time to time during the sample period. We are not
limiting ourselves to analyzing the events surrounding crises, and the comovements of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are
not conditional on the occurrence of crises.
19Table 3.2: Fixed Eﬀects Model
 
Dependent Variable: Real Credit Growth 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1/Real exchange rate  0.398***  0.374***  0.258**  0.234** 
 (0.081)  (0.053)  (0.119)  (0.113) 
N/T output ratio  0.273***  0.295***  0.198  0.283* 
 (0.081)  (0.040)  (0.151)  (0.146) 
Interest rate spread    -0.002  -0.073*** -0.064*** 
   (0.001)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
Investment     0.324***  0.203** 
     (0.112)  (0.083) 
Consumption     -0.390   
     (0.282)  
Deficit     0.617**  0.583** 
     (0.295)  (0.294) 
Net exports      0.000   
     (0.001)  
Adj. R
2  0.155 0.143 0.317 0.376 
# countries  30  26  25  25 
 
Note:. GLS regression results from a model with fixed effects. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses; * indicates significance at the 10 percent 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level and *** indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level.  
vary strongly with credit. Regressions 2 and 3 show that all parameters, except those on
consumption and net exports, are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. We ﬁnd similar results using
ﬁxed eﬀects estimation (Table 3.2). After dropping insigniﬁcant variables, all remaining
variables are signiﬁcant at the 5% level and have the same sign as in the random eﬀects
model.
As we can see in Figure 3.1, macroeconomic variables display similar comovements as
those shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. These stylized facts suggest that investment, rather
than consumption, should play a key role in the ampliﬁcation mechanism. Furthermore,
they indicate that any model of macroeoconomic comovements or of crises in MICs should
generate an equilibrium path along which credit varies negatively with the real exchange
rate, and positively with the N-to-T output ratio.
204. The Mechanism
To explain some of the stylized facts that we have described, the literature has looked to
ﬁnancial market imperfections as key ‘fundamentals’. Existing models are typically based
on one of two distortions: either “bad policy”, in the form of bailout guarantees, or “bad
markets”, in the form asymmetric information, or the imperfect enforceability of contracts
in ﬁnancial markets.14
On the one hand, policies that ensure agents against systemic crises (i.e., systemic bailout
guarantees), lead agents to take on more risk than they otherwise would. This can explain
risky debt denomination. On the other hand, credit market imperfections such as imperfect
enforceability of contracts or asymmetric information lead lenders to be very conservative
and give rise to credit constraints. The question arises as to whether one can construct
an internally consistent framework where guarantees do not neutralize the credit market
imperfections. Furthermore, can the interaction between these two distortions generate the
dynamic patterns that characterize the boom-bust cycle and the comovements alluded to
above?
Schneider and Tornell (2000) consider an economy where these two distortions do not
neutralize each other and show how their interaction generates several features of the boom
cycle. Tornell and Westermann (2002a and 2002b) show how this framework can explain the
comovements alluded to above and the strong credit channel that exists in MICs.
14See for instance, Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2000),
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999), Calvo (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), Krugman (1999)
and Mckinnon and Pill (1998).
21In what follows we discuss how some elements of these papers help explain the macroeco-
nomic patterns we described in the previous section. Consider an economy with two sectors:
a tradables sector (T) and a nontradables sector (N). T-sector agents have access to perfect
capital markets, while N-sector agents face enforceability problems and systemic guarantees.
The ﬁrst key result is that the interaction of systemic guarantees and enforceability
problems generates a self-reinforcing mechanism. On the one hand, if there is suﬃcient real
exchange rate risk: (a) binding credit constraints arise and (b) it is individually optimal for
an N-sector agent to issue debt denominated in T-goods (i.e., borrow in foreign currency
on a short-term). On the other hand, when many N-sector agents gamble by denominating
their debt in T goods, exchange rate risk may be endogenously created, as the economy
becomes vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling meltdowns of the banking system. If the amount of
T denominated debt is high, a real depreciation can severely squeeze cash ﬂow, or even
bankrupt banks altogether. Since they face binding borrowing constraints, they then have
to curtail lending to the N-sector. Weak investment demand from the N-sector for its own
products in turn validates the real depreciation. The systemic credit risk created by the
banking system thus induces endogenous exchange rate risk.
The second key result is that the interaction of binding borrowing constraints and T
denominated debt generates a dynamic path that resembles a boom-bust cycle and the
comovements we have characterized earlier. During the boom, the real appreciation reduces
the debt burden and relaxes credit constraints, permitting unusually fast growth in the
bank-dependent N-sector. This leads to further real appreciation, further relaxation of credit
22constraints and so on. Since the T-sector is not credit constrained, both the credit-to GDP
and the N-to-T output ratios follow increasing paths. However, the existence of risky debt
denomination makes the economy vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling twin crises, during which a real
depreciation coincides with both a meltdown of the banking system and a collapse of the
N-sector’s internal funds. In the aftermath of crisis the N-sector is outperformed by the
T-sector. Since banks are strongly exposed to the N-sector, a long-lasting credit crunch
outlives a brief recession.
To understand the ampliﬁcation mechanism in more detail consider an increase in the
domestic lending rate. This shock leads to higher debt service obligations and thus implies
that ﬁrms can now borrow less at each level of net worth. Lower borrowing results in lower
investment. This direct eﬀect is ampliﬁed because there is currency mismatch and part of
N-sector’s demand comes from the N-sector itself. In this case, the fall in demand for N-
goods, leads to a real depreciation. Since N-sector agents have dollar debt on the books,
while their revenues are denominated in the local currency, there is a fall in N-sector’s proﬁts
and net worth. A vicious circle ensues as lower net worth leads to even lower investment,
which leads to a lower demand for N-goods and a steeper real depreciation, which leads to
lower net worth and so on. This process might lead to twin crises in which a critical mass
of N-sector agents goes bust.
T-sector agents have access to international capital markets and can more easily substi-
tute away from domestic borrowing. Thus, their decisions are mostly aﬀected by the world
interest rate, not by the domestic lending rate. Therefore, a fall in credit is associated with a
23real depreciation and a decline in the N-to-T output ratio. Furthermore, the sectorial asym-
metry implies that the decline in GDP growth is milder than that of credit. This explains
the persistent swings in the credit-to-GDP ratio observed in the data.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have documented the existence of three credit markets imperfection preva-
lent in middle income countries (MICs). We have also discussed how they can account for
macroeoconomic patterns observed across MICs in recent decades.
In MICs borrowing constraints aﬀect many ﬁrms. However, their incidence is heavily
biased towards the non-tradables (N) sector. While tradables (T) sector ﬁrms tend to be
large and have access to world capital markets, N-sector ﬁrms are smaller on average and
are bank-dependent.
A second imperfection is the substantial amount of N-sector debt that is denominated in
foreign currency, while the income streams that service those debts are in domestic currency.
Since domestic banks are heavily exposed to the N-sector, the degree of currency mismatch
is signiﬁcant.
This sharp asymmetry in ﬁnancial opportunities and the severe currency mismatch are
key to understanding why there are sharp ﬂuctuations in the real exchange rate (the relative
price of N and T goods), and why they play a key role in the ampliﬁcation and propagation
of shocks in MICs.
The prevalence of currency mismatch does not appear out of the blue, but rather is the
24optimal response of borrowers and creditors to the existence of systemic guarantees,t h et h i r d
imperfection we have documented.
There is much work to be done in understanding economic ﬂuctuations in MICs. This pa-
per contributes to the literature by highlighting common macroeconomic regularities and by
documenting the existence of three credit market imperfections that are prevalent in other-
wise very diﬀerent MICs. In so doing, we have restricted the classes of plausible explanations
for economic ﬂuctuations that are common across MICs.
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27Appendix: Data Sources and Deﬁnitions
1. Panel regression. Source: World Bank Development Indicators (WBDI), IFS (IMF)
and OECD Statistical Compendium.
Criteria for country selection: We consider countries: a) that have a stock market and
the value of the stocks traded as a share of GDP is larger than 1%, b) that have a population
of more than 1 million people, c) that have a per capita income of more than $1000 but less
than $18 000 and d)that are not engaged in war or civil war (Iran, Iraq, Yugoslavia and
Lebanon). In addition, we consider Finland and Sweden. In total we have 39 countries. The
sample covers 20 years, from 1980 to 1999. The panel is unbalanced, as not all series cover
t h ef u l ls a m p l eo ra r ea v a i l a b l ef o ra l lc o u n t r i e s .
Variables included in the regression: Real credit growth: IMF, International ﬁnancial
Statistics, CD-ROM. Claims on private sector by deposit money banks (Lines 22d..ZF),
divided by CPI (Lines 64..ZF); N/T: Services: World Bank Development indicators (Code:
NV.SRV.TETC.KN), Manufacturing: World Bank Development indicators (Code: NV.IND.MANF.KN)
Construction: OECD Statistical Compendium, Main indicators of industrial activity and in-
dividual central banks. See Tornell and Westermann (2002a) for selection criteria for N and
T- Sectors; Interest rate spread: World Bank Development indicators (Code: FR.INR.LNDP);
Real interest rate: World Bank Development indicators (Code: FR.INR.RINR); Gross do-
mestic ﬁxed investment: World Bank Development indicators (Code: NE.GDI.FTOT.KN);
Private Consumption: World Bank Development indicators (Code: NE.CON.PRVT.KN)
2. Probit regressions. Source: World Business Economic Survey (WBES).
28Variables included in the regressions: label var gcf “General constraint–ﬁnancing” 1=no
obstacle 4=major obstacle; label var exp_yn “Exports” 1=yes, 2=no; label var exp_pct
“% of output exported”; label var yr_estb “year established”; label var gvt_pct “Percent
government ownership.”
3. Currency Mismatch: Sources: Bank of Argentina, Bank of Brazil, Bank of Korea,
Bank of Peru, Bank of Turkey, BANXICO, Dirección General de Investigación Económica.
Indicadores Económicos, May 1996 and 2001. Dziobek, Claudia, J. Kim Hobbs and David
Marston, 2000, “Toward a Framework for Systemic Liquidity Policy,” IMF Working Pa-
per 00/34 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). Takatoshi Ito and Luiz A. Pereira
da Silva: "The Credit Crunch in Thailand during the 1997-98 Crisis: Theoretical and op-
erational issues with the JEXIM survey". Steven Kamin, Philip Turner and Jozef Van’t
Dack*, "The transmission mechanism of monetary policy in emerging market economies: an
overview", mimeo, BIS conference, OECD Bank Proﬁtaility statisitics.
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